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Qui docet discit.
I. INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to have this opportunity to contribute a short, in-
formal piece to this symposium issue of the Idaho Law Review. I write
from a particular and somewhat limited perspective.' While I prac-
ticed law for a time, I have spent most of my 26 years as a lawyer
teaching at a state university law school (so far I have "lucked out'). I
teach a variety of courses--I am something of a utility infielder. I
have never held myself out to be an academic superstar, or even a
"specialist" in legal ethics;2 although, over the years, I have advised
hundreds (possibly thousands) of practicing lawyers, helping them
deal with "ethics questions. ' Having pled guilty to this, I am happy to
1. Perspective seems to be everything. One commentator agrees with me that
there is a "disjunction" between legal education and the legal profession, but he does not
seem to think it is getting better. That is, he contends that fewer professors have practical
experience than before. Then again, he refers to the elite law schools. I would not know
about that. That is not the way it is in my neck of the woods. He also contends that, in the
actual practice of law, the rules of ethics are irrelevant. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Eth-
ics In Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the
Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705 (1998). If he means that practitioners do not in-
stinctively look at the rules, I might agree. But in my fourteen years as a state bar ethics
chairman, not a week went by in which I did not discuss the content of the Kentucky
Rules of Professional Conduct with at least one lawyer with an ethics question. See infra
note 3 and accompanying text. Perhaps the conclusion that we should draw, if we are not
completely full of ourselves, is that generalizations are hazardous.
2. The largest one day sale of my book RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H.
FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHIcs (1988), was made the day our librarian re-ordered the six copies
that had been stolen from our law library.
3. 1 provided this advice "free" as a member of a bar association ethics commit-
tee. I have been informed that I am just about the only academic that has had anything
good to say about bar association ethics committees. See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association
Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFrsTA L. REV. 731, 740 (2002). I suspect that
may be because few academic lawyers offer to serve on such committees. We have had
better law school bar association cooperation in Kentucky. All three state law schools
have provided committee members. Idaho's new Dean, Don Burnett, served as Ethics
Chairman when he was a Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Louisville.
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say that I have managed to avoid serving as an expert witness or pri-
vate ethics consultant for hire.'
In this short piece I want to say a few things that other academ-
ics teaching legal ethics may find disturbing. I say this because I be-
lieve that I may be swimming against the current academic fashion.
Of course, it is possible that I do not have a very good handle on the
current academic fashion. I hope I am not setting up a straw person to
knock down, but I may be.5 If I am, I am sure someone will call me to
task.
What I am going to say is this: contrary to popular belief (among
practitioners, at least) law teaching is probably better than it used to
be, especially in the areas of legal ethics and professionalism;6 and law
students and practicing lawyers probably have a better understanding
of the content of the professional codes than they used to have. Things
may not be like they used to be in that late, great Golden Age that
some allude to, but then again, they probably never were. I think that
all of this can be attributed to better teaching of the "rules" (or if you
prefer, the "Rules') in law school, and better Continuing Legal Educa-
tion, as well as the interest in the rules that was generated as the
Model Rules were formulated and adopted, first at the ABA level, and
then at the state level. I am one of those who believe that it is best to
concentrate on "the nuts and bolts of the rules of professional con-
4. I did give expert testimony once in a "foreign" case--a case in a neighboring
state. That was enough for me. As chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association Ethics
Committee I had an "official stamp" which I did not think should be used, for my profit,
either for or against a Kentucky Lawyer. I have also learned, over the years, that when
people want to pay for my opinion, they usually don't want my opinion at all. They want
affirmation, and they want to buy my name. For now let me say that I consider the pro-
fessorial expert on the law to be a negative development in litigation. I do not see why ex-
perts on the law cannot make their points in written briefs. While there may be some
need for expert testimony on the standard of care in malpractice cases, I am not sure why
we need a whole cottage industry--the cottage being infested by moonlighting professors
of law. Wow-am I going to get it for saying that! But at least I am not as critical as
Judge Cleland. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (telling us what he thinks about professorial ethics experts; ouch!).
5. Lawyers and academics often employ the "fallacy of distortion" by setting up
a "straw person." See Richard Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial. 18 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 151, 180-81 (1994); Jack Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 PAC. L.J. 59, 95
(1981). The lawyer or academic "talking head" employing this techniques will (1) falsely
characterize his opponent's position, and then having thought up the false position and
passed it off as the opponent's position, will (2) proceed to knock that position down. You
see this a lot on shows like "Nightline." Unfortunately, the technique is also used in la re-
view articles. I was recently on the receiving end of this ploy, but I won't mention any
names. Why draw attention to an article that no one will read otherwise.
6. If you don't want to take my word for it, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Teaching
Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century After Watergate, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (2000).
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duct" in a basic course on professional responsibility, rather than at-
tempting to teach "morality or personal ethics,"6 or "values ethics," or
whatever. I am saying this because I have the sense from many of the
articles I am reading (again, I may be wrong) that a lot of academic
lawyers are taking up the position that focusing on the rules: (1) nec-
essarily leads students and practitioners to conclude that there is
nothing more to legal ethics than a minimal set of disciplinary rules,
(2) leads students and practitioners to conclude that if something is
not explicitly prohibited by the rules then anything goes, and even (3)
leads students and practitioners to the view that focusing on the en-
forcement of such rules may not even induce ethical "behavior" be-
cause it "removes [the] rules from the realm of conscience.... [Tlhat
principles cease to be moral when they become laws."9
The last of these propositions seems to me to be false. I disagree
with the other two propositions to this extent."0 First of all, no one
ever said that the rules were all there is to legal ethics."1 I don't know
anyone that teaches that. I don't see why careful consideration of "the
rules as they are," and even a certain amount of parsing of the lan-
7. See Elizabeth A. Alston, Fundamentalism in the Legal Education Curricu-
lum, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 123, 123-24 (2002).
& Id. at 124. I hope that by doing so I am not "merely trivializ[ing] the subject
matter." Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589(1985).
9. Contra JOHN KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 213 (1988).
10. 1 am concurring in part and dissenting in part. Lawyers do, in fact, narrowly
construe ethics rules to rationalize their conduct, both before, and after, they take action.
In this regard, see infra Part VII.A for my discussion of the drift toward practice in lim-
ited liability companies. Of course, judges narrowly construe the rules of judicial ethics
too. See Caudill v. Judicial Ethics Comm., 986 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1998). This is a ridiculous
opinion which allowed Kentucky judges to employ their wives as secretaries. Under the
Kentucky version of the Code of Judicial Conduct in effect at the time (it has since been
amended), the court noted that Canon 3B(4) merely said that judges "should... avoid
nepotism." Id. at 436. It did not, like the ABA 1990 version, say the judge "shall avoid
nepotism." Id. at 436 n.1. However, the court ignored the fact that the commentary to the
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct upon which the Kentucky Code was based said that al-
though "should" is used, the language is still language of discipline. See E. WAYNE THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 5 (1973) (arguing that the canons and
text establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated); LISA MIIAORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 8 (1992); JEFFREY SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 5 (3d. ed. 1990).
11. Referring to the Model Code distinction between "ethical considerations" and
"disciplinary rules," Philosopher John Kultgen quips that "ethics for the AMA is what is
enforced; for the ABA, what is not enforced." See KULTGEN, supra note 9, at 228.
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guage of the rules, precludes serious consideration of "values. 1 2 Sec-
ondly, we all know, and we all teach, that many practices are implic-
itly prohibited by the rules, and by other law, including procedural
law, the common law and other forms of judicial control. If practitio-
ners operate on the assumption that anything goes when it is not ex-
plicitly prohibited" by a Code Disciplinary Rule or a Model Rule, that
is not so much the fault of the drafters of the Code or Rules or the
fault of the law teachers, as it is the "fault," or a consequence, of our
adversarial system. 14
In any event, in my legal world-which I think is the real
world-there are a surprising number of lawyers who do not follow
even the basic, blackletter rules. As far as I am concerned, if we could
get everyone more or less on board, and get them to follow the rules,
that would be something. I don't think that we've gotten to that point
yet.'5 Until we do, I'll leave the more philosophical work to others.
12. In the context of discipline, is it not legitimate for the respondent and his
counsel to argue for strict construction? If a highly conscientious lawyer reads duties into
them rather than from them, should we necessarily use that lawyer's interpretation as a
basis for disciplining others? Is there a due process issue here? Cf In re A, 554 P.2d 479
(Or. 1976). I have been surprised by the willingness of courts to turn interpretive advisory
opinions into disciplinary "law."
13. This is a variation on the theme that I hear a lot of trial lawyers pushing-
that if something can be done for the client, then it must be done. I certainly don't teach
that, and I frequently warn my students that this kind of "ethics" may lead to some very
bad tactics.
14. Cf KULTGEN, supra note 9, at 327. Kultgen characterizes the ABA's ethical
standards as defining the lawyer's central obligations as procedural--"to make the system
work." Id. at 239. As a result of this "legalistic attitude," some important values may, on
occasion, be "relegat[ed]... to subsidiary rank." Id. at 327. For some interesting com-
ments regarding the professions faith in the adversary system, see Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 596 (1985) ("Lawyers are
concerned with the production of belief, not of knowledge. Why assume, to paraphrase
Macaulay, that the fairest results will emerge from two advocates arguing as unfairly as
possible on opposite sides.").
Actually, if the concern is that the shift to a blackletter law of lawyering invites
lawyers to narrowly construe professional rules to favor their own interests, in the same
way that they might narrowly construe the language of contracts or statutes in a way
that favors their clients, there may be something to it. But rationalization of one's con-
duct, and strained and narrow construction of professional rules, motivated by the law-
yer's self-interest, may actually be more common in "office" or corporate practice than in
litigation. In "office" practice the financial rewards of "cheating" may be huge and the
lawyer's conduct may not be open to inspection by an opponent, a judge, or a regulator.
15. See Rhode, supra note 14, at 598-99 ("In a national survey of 1500 large-firm
litigators, half of those responding believed that unfair and inadequate disclosure of ma-
terial information prior to trial was a 'regular or frequent' problem. Similarly, 69% of sur-
veyed antitrust attorneys had encountered unethical practices in complex cases; the most
frequently cited abuses were tampering with witnesses' responses and destroying evi-
dence.").
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I do want to point out some problems that I have had with the
way the rules have been enacted and interpreted. Some individuals
and interest groups have had more say than others. I hope I can dis-
cuss this without being accused of inciting class warfare. I also want
to suggest that some of the rules, and some of the "core values" of the
profession, will continue to come under attack, and that future attacks
will likely come not from the fringes of the profession, but rather from
the "elite" law firms. One of my themes will be that the reevaluation of
the Model Code, and the adoption process for the Model Rules, edu-
cated a lot of lawyers about what the professional rules actually were.
Many lawyers had only a limited knowledge of what was in the Model
Code.' 6 For the most part, this education, or reeducation, of the bar
was a good thing. On the other hand, not everything about it was nec-
essarily good. Lawyers discovered that they didn't like many of these
rules, and that the rules imposed some serious opportunity costs.
While the traditional note sounded at Law Day was, and continues to
be, that "the law is not a mere money getting trade," the blues sung on
less ceremonial occasions is "why can't we do what everyone else [ac-
countants, investment bankers, etc.] is allowed to do."'7 Lawyers also
learned how easy it was to change the Rules. 8 Some of the changes
were not for the better, and I fear that "we ain't seen nothin' yet."
At this point I should probably warn the reader that my evidence
might be characterized as "anecdotal." In response, let me say that
these days this word (like so many other words) is over-used, and even
misused. It is dismissive.1 9 Let me give you an example of what I
mean. Every once in a while I attempt to teach Bioethics with my
chums over at the medical school. Some years ago I participated in a
collection of presentations given on the occasion of the publication of
Dr. Sherwin Nuland's wonderful book How We Die: Reflections on
16. See also Rotunda, supra note 6, at 664. It is worth noting that the great out-
cry over the Kutak Commission's 1983 proposed Model Rules had to do with a perceived
radical revision of the rules governing client confidentiality, even though the version of
Rule 1.6 that was presented was, at least on its face, more protective of client confidenti-
ality than the 1969 Model Code. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the
State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,1441 (1992).
17. This argument comes up a lot. I mention it in a number of my Camera Eye
scenarios. A good example of this drift is the new MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT R.
1.17 (2002) (Sale of Law Practice).
18. LC. Rotunda, supra note 6, at 668.
19. See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Comment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 801-02 (1990)
('One gathers that Professor Lerman does not like lawyers .... Was professor Lerman
never told an anecdote of decent, even outstanding, conduct by another lawyer."') (re-
sponding to Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990), an excellent
article, in my opinion).
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Life's Final Chapter." Dr. Nuland honored us with a lecture, and in
the Q&A one of the young (well, not really very young) people in the
audience took offense at his evaluation of the performance of hospital
ethics committees, based on his experience-that is, the listener was
upset that Dr. Nuland said something she disagreed with (she was a
proud member of a hospital ethics committee). She condescendingly
opined that his observations were based on "anecdotal evidence."
When he sagely pointed out that all evidence, all data, all observa-
tions, are, in a sense, anecdotal, she was genuinely taken aback.
There is, indeed, a fallacy of anecdotal evidence-one should not put
faith in an example or two that run against the bulk of data support-
ing an unwelcome proposition. But Dr. Nuland's experiences and ob-
servations were worth hearing, and might have benefited a listener
with an open mind. But I digress. On with the anecdotes. Just for fun,
I will present them in the style of Dos Passos, through The Camera
Eye.21
II. THE WAY WE WERE
As I was saying, law teaching is probably better than it used to
be, especially in the areas of legal ethics and professionalism; and law
students and practicing lawyers probably have a better understanding
of the content of the professional codes than they used to have (al-
though that may not be saying much?).
A. The Camera Eye (1)
I entered law school in 1973, after a four year stint in the army. I
figured that law school had to be better than Viet Nam, and most days
it was. Back then the newly admitted student was fingerprinted and
given an appointment with the Character and Fitness Committee. I
recall going to the digs of a law firm that specialized in real estate
work. The building that it was housed in was almost all glass, like the
Death Star. A very young partner (associate?) attempted a rather
stern interrogation. Since I had been trained in interrogation and
other, even blacker arts, I found his demeanor rather silly. He asked
me what kind of civic contributions I had made to my community
lately. I told him that I had been out of the country for a while. He
then asked me how I voted in the last Presidential election (I don't
think I am making this up. I know he asked me if I voted). I told him.
20. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE: REFLEcTIONS ON LinE'S FINAL CHAFrER
(1994).
21. The obscure literary allusion is to his trilogy U.SA. (1930-36).
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that although I had left the army with the rank of captain, the last
such election was only the second, no, maybe the first that I was old
enough to vote in, but that I was not able to get an absentee ballot in
the place that I was stuck in at the time. 'That's no excuse!", he
snorted. Fortunately, I still managed to pass his character and fitness
test.
If you started law school around the same time I did you proba-
bly remember Watergate. Many of the scoundrels were lawyers. They
would have been scoundrels anyway, even if they had been produce
managers from the local grocery. But the presence of so many lawyers
on the list of malefactors was "shocking .. . shocking!" The upshot of it
all was that the ABA decided that if we had a mandatory ethics class
in law school, lawyers would be more ethical in the future, and Wa-
tergates would not happen, or at least there would be ethical lawyers
to "say no," or even blow the whistle early on. So we had to go to a
two-hour mandatory ethics class. I guess this would have been in 1975
or 1976. We were given a copy of the ABA Model Code, and we bought
a casebook (I don't remember which one but there weren't many
then), and we were told to memorize the Code. There would be a true-
false test on its contents at the end of the class.2 2 The newest member
of the faculty was assigned to teach the class. He was awful. He al-
most never referred to the casebook. He spent most of his time talking
about his one-year stint at a New York law factory. As far as I could
tell he spent the entire year of his practice career playing a very mi-
nor role in one extended tender offer battle. Most of us had no idea of
what a tender offer was. As I recall, he was denied tenure. He proba-
bly ended up being the Dean of a more prestigious law school. In any
event, I passed the course (how hard could that be?); but I didn't learn
much about legal ethics.
Later, in practice at a large and prestigious firm (and it was an
excellent law firm), I don't recall participating in many discussions
about ethics,2 although I found a lot of things about practice trou-
bling, and looking back, I can see that I was thinking about ethics. I
know I resented the lack of professional autonomy that I had as a
young associate. Was I really going to have to spend the rest of my life
22. A true-false test in a professional school? How serious can this be?
23. I did find out what tender offers were.
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handling cases that partners dumped on me that seemed to have just
enough merit to get past the laugh test? 4
B. The Camera Eye (2)
Years later I am at the Ringside Bar25 in Columbus, Ohio, having
a brew with my former supervising partner and one of his side-kicks.
My former mentor is now serving as a Commissioner for the Ohio Su-
preme Court, dealing with issues of ethics and professional discipline.
I am the Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Bar As-
sociation. We are talking about the state of the profession. I expressed
the view that things seem to be getting worse. He tells me I am crazy!
Have I hurt his feelings? He tells me that 'Things are much better
now, but you can't see it, because you don't know how bad it used to
be. Your problem is that you expect too much."
Looking back, I think what he said was probably right.
C. The Camera Eye (3)
I am in the chambers of Judge David S. Porter, United States
District Judge, Cincinnati, Ohio. Judge Porter is an avuncular man,
and a raconteur. He is self-effacing. He likes lawyers. He is slow to
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 3.1 (2002). My favorite case, in ret-
rospect, was the one I had to push, brought on behalf of a farmer-a devotee of "sweet
corn," as I recall. It went something like this: Old McDonald, we will call him, had a farm
in the middle of a state forest. The state decided to import beaver into the area for what-
ever reason (possibly there was a good reason). Beaver had been run out of the area for at
least fifty years. The beaver reproduced like crazy, which beavers will do (I addressed this
in one of my briefs to the court, if you are interested). They flooded out the farm. One of
the partners in my fi-m, who did not do litigation (as I recall he was a "corporate twin-
kie'), decided this was a "taking" by state beavers, and that the state owed the farmer just
compensation. The partner filed the case, and then passed it to a junior partner, who
passed it to an associate, who dumped it on me before he left the firm (he was not happy
in his work). I survived a motion to dismiss, establishing as a matter of law that there
could be a taking by beaver. We found the trapper who brought in the beaver, and I
thought I might have actually pulled this one off. Unfortunately, the court ultimately de-
cided that I failed to meet my burden of proof because, the judges hypothesized, these
particular beaver could have wandered in from Indiana. This possibility had never oc-
curred to me, because these beaver were not that big and not that stupid. In any event, I
am not making this up.
Oops-I almost forgot. One of the two state attorneys on the case married the court
reporter who took the deposition of the trapper. I do not remember being invited to the
wedding even though I had brought them together, but I am told that they exchanged lit-
tle silver beavers. Sad.
25. This joint has a cool painting of boxers that looks like a George Bellows, de-
pending on how many brews you have consumed. Bellows was from Columbus, but I do
not think the painting is a Bellows.
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anger. But today he is pretty pissed off. We clerks have been working
the motion docket. I have brought him a complaint, a motion to dis-
miss, the reply, etc. The complaint demands that Judge Porter, the
U.S. District Judge, order the Attorney General of the United States
to indict the Justices of the Supreme Court for violating the Declara-
tion of Independence (because every fetus has the right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness) by issuing their opinion in Roe v.
Wade.26 1 have recommended that the case be dismissed (for any num-
ber of reasons that I did not think needed to be enumerated).27 Judge
Porter approves the recommendation, but pens in additional language
to the effect that the complaint is frivolous and was no doubt filed for
publicity. His opinion is journalized and a copy is placed in the "Pub-
lic" or "press" box in the clerk's office. Later a reporter picks it up and
reports on the dismissal of the frivolous and publicity seeking plead-
ings. Within a short time a series of lawyers and a law professor hit
the radio waves stridently condemning the dismissal, opining that the
pleading sought a good faith modification or reversal of existing law,
and that any publicity attendant to the matter was the fault of the
judge.
As a law clerk I saw only a very small slice of professional life.
On the other hand, what I did see often left much to be desired. It was
not uncommon to encounter deceptive briefs which omitted, or grossly
distorted, existing law.2 Perjury sometimes reared its ugly head, in
both civil and criminal cases. While it was rare, lawyers sometimes
appeared drunk, or engaged in bizarre or volatile behavior. It is hard
to generalize, but I didn't see anything different then than I see now.
Judge Porter pushed my lawyerscope back even further in time. He
was a great story teller. Years before he had served as a member of a
county bar disciplinary committee in Eastern Ohio. He recounted
some shocking (but perhaps amusing) incidents. There was the lawyer
whose m.o. was to take divorce cases for women, initiate proceedings,
and then refuse to file critical paperwork unless his clients had sex
with him. When called to task, he actually expressed shock that the
members of the hearing panel did not do this. "Gentlemen," he said,
'you have missed out on one of the finest emoluments of the legal pro-
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. I suspect that since I have said something about abortion I will be blasted; so
let me enumerate. My problem with this lawsuit was that it ignored the role of the Court
in interpreting the Constitution, assumed that the Declaration of Independence is law,
assumed that natural law can be turned into federal criminal common law, assumed
away separation of powers, and assumed away judicial immunity. Don't blast me until
you can explain all of this away. Perhaps you can, but I cannot.
28. Why lawyers engage in this kind of deception is beyond me. Law clerks ac-
tually read and double check the authorities cited in briefs, and do independent research.
In short, the odds are great that the lawyer will be caught and lose his or her credibility.
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fession." The Judge told me of his days as a state common pleas judge.
Although he did not drink himself, he kept a bottle of whiskey in his
chambers in the event that one of several local lawyers who appeared
before him had an episode of the D.T.s during a trial. None of this
proves anything, of course, but it explains why I am skeptical as to
whether that Golden Age ever existed.
But let's get back to the present. If it is true that students and
practicing lawyers have a better understanding of the content of the
professional codes than they used to have, why is that? Again, I think
it can be attributed to a greater concentration on the teaching of the
Code and Rules in law schools and in CLE programs. It is probably
not because of the publication of lengthy, philosophical think pieces in
prestigious law journals, which practicing lawyers do not read. Here I
am going to take a bit of a detour, and probably infuriate my col-
leagues, but I cannot resist.
III. OF PROFESSORS AND PRACTITIONERS
I have a sense that law teaching is not only better, but also more
"practice oriented" than it used to be. It is much more likely these
days that new recruits joining the faculty will have had some substan-
tial experience in the practice. Clinical legal education is now respect-
able. Practice skills courses in trial practice, negotiation, legal writing
and drafting, abound. Specialty courses, sometimes interdisciplinary
courses, are available in specific areas of the law. Still, the law faculty
and the bar are separated by a rather high wall. Professors write for
each other, and speak to each other-sometimes in a language of their
own. 2 9 Some academics eschew the practice and practitioners. If aca-
demic lawyers are going to isolate themselves from the practice, it is
hard to see how they are going to have much impact on the ethics of
the "denizens of the bar."30
In the unlikely event that this piece is read by someone who is
not a law professor, let me give you an idea of how a typical, collegial
discussion might go in the faculty lounge.
29. To this extent I agree with Judge Harry Edwards. See Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession" A Postscript,
91 MICH. L. REv. 2191 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and The Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 34 (1992).
30. This is the sort of language you hear at meetings of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools.
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A. The Camera Eye (4)
Professor # 1: (Tentatively) I think I understand your position.
Are you trying to say (blah, blah and blah)?
Professor # 2: (Painfully) That's not exactly what I'm trying to
say (blah, blah and blah).
Having failed to express himself in a way that could be understood,
Professor # 2 begins to talk about what John Rawls might say about
whatever it was that he had been trying, unsuccessfully, to get across.
This does not help much either.
B. The Camera Eye (5)
Meanwhile, we are back at the faculty lounge. I am talking to one
of my colleagues, who is also on the bar association's Ethics Commit-
tee, about a draft opinion. Another faculty member who has just come
into the lounge inserts himself into the conversation to inform us that
when he practiced (for a short time) some years ago (many years ago
by my standards) in a New York firm, a senior partner told him that
people on bar association ethics committees are usually the most un-
ethical lawyers of all. The possibility that this might insult us proba-
bly does not occur to him.
Of course, practicing lawyers are just as contemptuous of aca-
demics as academics are of practitioners. There is plenty of fault to go
around.
C. The Camera Eye (6)
It is Fall, and it is time for the Visiting Committee to, well, visit
the law school again. For those of you who are not familiar with visit-
ing committees, let me explain how this works. Deans appoint promi-
nent law alumni to a visiting committee. They come to a school and
listen to a series of presentations by 'The Administrators"-the fac-
ulty is usually not involved in any meaningful way. The visitors are
encouraged to hold forth on all of the things the school ought to be do-
ing to get those goofy, impractical professors on the right track. Then
the Dean takes the visitors over to the President of the University to
tell him how he is not providing adequate support for the law school.
This is the real purpose of a visiting committee. Then the visitors
leave, go back to work, and presumably forget all of the things that
they recommended. This is just as well, because we usually end up ig-
noring all of their advice anyway.
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This year the hot topic for discussion is "Who should be the next
University President." At the 'Taculty Luncheon" I am sitting with
the Associate Dean. Across the table are two former Bar Presidents. I
have worked extensively with both of them during my tenure as ethics
chairman. They are both excellent and highly successful lawyers. The
subject of the new University President comes up. They ask us who
we think might be a good pick. Since we have no meaningful input to
the selection process, we haven't invested much time thinking about
it, we don't have much to offer up. Then one of the lawyers gives us
his pick. He does so after a long, dramatic moment of silence. "Jack
Welch," he says slowly and reverently. I am bemused. He is serious.
Why would Jack Welch want to "graze in the Bluegrass." Then I re-
member. Jack's wife, Jane, is one of our graduates. Great, I think, she
actually knows us, which cannot be good for us, and she would proba-
bly start meddling in our affairs too. No way Jack! Of course, we did
not get Jack Welch for President. Anyway, after floating the Jack
Welch trial balloon, one turns to the other and says, 'In any event, we
don't want an academic." The possibility that this might insult us
probably does not occur to either of them.
D. The Camera Eye (7)
I am chairing a meeting of the bar association's Unauthorized
Practice Committee. The Committee has been presented with a draft
opinion, which has been prepared by an ad hoc committee of real es-
tate lawyers. They are concerned that title companies are doing clos-
ings. Our Supreme Court Rules contain an extremely broad definition
of unauthorized practice.3 1 Under the rule, it is unauthorized practice
for a corporation to provide legal services to a member of the public,
even through a licensed lawyer-employee. The arguments become
more and more convoluted. The lawyer presenters go so far as to ar-
gue that no real estate closing should be allowed unless the parties
have lawyers. Surely they do not mean that the parties to a real es-
tate transaction can be forced to hire lawyers if they do not want
them? Yes, they are on a roll (indeed, they are carried away), and they
go so far as to subscribe to that view. They are getting testy with my
reluctance to rubber stamp their offerings. One of them mutters under
his breath that my skepticism is "anti-lawyer." The possibility that
this might insult me probably does occur to him.
31. Ky. Sup. Cr. R. 3.020.
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IV. IN SEARCH OF A PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS
The early lawyer codes were drawn up by high-minded and self-
appointed gentlemen, based on earlier treatises written by teachers of
the law.32 The first code that was actually adopted by a "bar associa-
tion" was based on George Sharswood's work. This early code, referred
to disparagingly in academic circles as the "Confederate Code" be-
cause it was first adopted in Alabama, was adopted by the Kentucky
State Bar Association (a voluntary association) in 1903.11 The 1908
ABA Canons were more or less based on this earlier code. They were
not incorporated into Kentucky law until 1946. Commentators observe
that these Canons were more or less the assertions of "elite lawyers in
the ABA. 3' 4 The ABA Canons were not replaced until 1969 by the ABA
Model Code. This new Model Code was adopted in Kentucky in 1971,
and had been adopted by all but three states by 1972.
This new Code was interesting and important for at least three
reasons. First of all, the format was new, and might have been se-
lected by a philosopher, because the document contains minimum re-
quirements (disciplinary rules) as well as aspirational ethical consid-
erations. While the document appears somewhat byzantine, and
makes for difficult reading, it reinforces the notion that the discipli-
nary law (that which is enforced) is not all there is to ethics. Secondly,
the document followed careful study by a committee, and it was pre-
sented to a "representative body" of the ABA (the House of Delegates)
for adoption. That is, while it was still handed down from above, a lot
of lawyers got to look at it and see what they liked and disliked.
Thirdly, the Code sowed the seeds of its own destruction in that it fo-
cused a great deal on economic issues and what we might call "dig-
nity" issues. Elaborate rules on advertising, business getting, and trial
publicity were imposed by the "elite." It was not long before the ABA
was drawing disciplinary lines in the sand. In my early days, these
dignity rules were strictly enforced, if nothing else was. A showdown
was inevitable. The courts were not sympathetic to the efforts of the
state bar associations to exert what was perceived as economic control
32. See DAVID HOFFMAN, Professional Deportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY
324, 324-34 (1817); George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics (1854), reprinted
in 32 ABA REP. 1 (1907). Hoffman lectured to students in Baltimore, Maryland. Shars-
wood reopened the University of Pennsylvania law department in 1850, after the practic-
ing bar had, in effect, closed it down. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 320-21, 607 (2d ed. 1985).
33. Oops! What is that? Oh, dear! At the end of the Code there is a small line
that signals "that's the end." Then, on the other side of the line, there is a racist joke. In-
deed, the whole journal is peppered with racist jokes and advertisements for mens' cloth-
ing. See 3 KY. LJ., No. 1, 18 (1914).
34. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986).
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over their members, and struck much of this regulation.35 What the
ABA did was fight the wrong battle. Elements of an increasingly di-
verse bar learned that the ethics rules, previously imposed from
above, could be bucked.
3 6
In comparison with the 1908 Canons, the Model Code had a rela-
tively short shelf life. The ABA appointed a study commission to come
up with a new code. However, by this time the diverse elements of the
bar had become more vocal, and demanded participation. The work
product of the committee (the Kutak Commission) was subjected to
public and professional scrutiny and criticism as a work in progress,
and no amount of scholarly research and persuasion could prevent the
successive drafts of the new Rules from being watered down.
Was there ever a professional consensus of what the ethics of the
profession should be? If one looks at the language of the lawyer Codes
from the late 1800s up to the present time, one might think so. I, for
one, am struck by the similarities more than I am struck by their dif-
ferences. There is a comforting sense of continuity. Indeed, even with
its Restatement format, the Model Rules emerged as something not
all that radically different from what went before. Indeed, a new law
graduate weaned on the Model Rules would find George Warvelle's
1902 text, Essays In Legal Ethics, easy reading. Its content would be
familiar territory. But how much professional consensus was there
really? How much do we really agree on today? My adventures in le-
gal ethics have taught me that there is less consensus than one might
hope for. I fear that many of the rules, and even some "core values" of
the profession, are up for grabs.
35. See Rotunda, supra note 6, at 667-68 (stating that when "[tihe ABA success-
fully required law schools to teach legal ethics .... the lawyers... turned to the legal
rules, [and] discovered that they did not often like what they saw. What followed from
that revelation has been a series of law suits successfully challenging ethics rules and in-
validating them on constitutional or statutory grounds.'); KULTmEN, supra note 9, at 215
("'he disciplinary utility of codes is limited because enforcement mechanisms are
weak.... [The efforts of courts to limit the control of associations over the economic be-
havior of their members deter them from strengthening their ethical influence.").
36. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Oliver v. Ky. Bar As'n,
779 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1989) (approving temporary lawyer services).
37. Perhaps the most vociferous professional interest group opposing the Model
Rules was the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, which went so far as to publish a
counterproposal styled the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct. The preamble to this in-
teresting document bristles with the language of professional class struggle--the civil
plaintiffs' bar and the criminal defense bar versus the corporate lawyers (at the service of
the malefactors of great wealth) and government lawyers. However, there were other crit-
ics, including scholars and lawyers who felt that the Restatement format of the new Rules
(which omitted the aspirational ethical considerations), while perhaps more reader
friendly, would lead lawyers to think of the ethics rules as mere minimums-a compen-
dium of sanctions.
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I say this as one who thinks that professional codes are valuable,
even if they are not the whole of legal ethics.38 As Professor Kultgen
notes,39 'The sense of common values is enhanced when codes are
taught in professional schools." Furthermore:
The most obvious function is guidance for those practitio-
ners who have not thought through moral issues. Codification
would be otiose if the obligation of professionals were always
obvious and could be met without sacrifice, if professionals
never faced difficult dilemmas or always did what was right as
a matter of course or could handle every question on the basis
of common morality. . ... [An ideal code would relieve us] of the
burden of ethical inquiry [because our] primary responsibility
is to ... counsel.., not to puzzle over ethical questions.40
No one says that codes can eliminate the need for personal judgment
and no code can make decisions mechanical. 'Every code must be
treated as a hypothesis to be tested and adapted while following it.""
It is also true that the ABA Model Rules, like other professional
codes, contain provisions that seem to conflict. Which provision takes
priority? A single provision can be cited in isolation to rationalize du-
bious behavior. 2 Still, that does not mean we should give up on codes
of ethics.
38. 1 am told that in the old days at the University of Kentucky College of Law,
the ancient, aristocratic, and hard-drinking professor who taught the legal ethics course
would continuously opine that "a gentleman does not need a code of ethics." That may ex-
plain why several generations of graduates didn't learn much about the subject. They did
learn how to drink, though. I am told that this popular professor would get drunk with his
students (virtually all male in those days), and they would then take him home and put
him in a tub of water, with a large floatation device around his neck to prevent his drown-
ing. In the morning he would be ready to go again. He died in his 90s. One of his col-
leagues gave the eulogy, observing that "we told him that all that drinking would kill
him, and it did."
When I make CLE presentations (I've get to stop doing these!), I still take pot shots
from older (Hell, I'm old. They're ancient.) gentlemen of the bar who express disgust at
my cynicism. Why don't I think that lawyers will just do the right thing?. Maybe it's be-
cause this is a state in which lawyers have drafted mineral leases for unsophisticated
land owners, giving the lawyers contingent fees. That is, the lawyer gets so much per ton
for any minerals extracted in the future, to compensate him for this form lease. This sort
of thing is defended as "customary."
39. KULTGEN, supra note 9, at 213.
40. Id. at 216.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 226.
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V. PROBLEM RULES
A. The Camera Eye (8)
I am at an Annual Meeting of the Kentucky Bar Association. I
have made a short presentation on the progress of the ABA Model
Rules. One of the speakers is the managing partner of the law firm
where I spent a couple of years before donning the veil of poverty (be-
fore entering law teaching). He is truly an amazing and forceful char-
acter. He was even selected to be the President of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers. The firm, which is very much the "House that
[he] built," represents scores of big corporate clients. We are both sur-
prised to run into each other, and comment on what a "small world" it
really is. During my presentation I had referred to several Rules as
'lawyer favorable." He was amused by that. Looking back, I think that
it would have been better if I would have described these Rules as
"client favorable," and 'lawyer unfavorable." I think of him, because I
suspect that he may have been instrumental in shaping the Rules."
Two of the Rules that I had alluded to as "lawyer favorable" were
Rules 1.6 and 1.13. I used those adjectives because it seemed to me
that in the area of corporate practice, at least, the practicing bar
pushed for, and got, Rules that gave their clients the maximum in
terms of protection of what we used to call "client confidences and se-
crets"-or in the new parlance, protection of "information relating to
the representation." The Rules, as they emerged after a working over
by the House of Delegates, would, at least insofar as the corporate
practice is concerned, choose (dare I say it) client interests over the
public interests. Now there is certainly nothing unusual about profes-
sional code writers choosing to look askance at "Practices that might
jeopardize the professional's position... [like] whistle-blowing....
Codes choose self-interest over the interest of the public." 4 But I find
43. See John C. Elam, ABA Must Preserve Client Confidentiality; Lawyers
Shouldn't Be Police Agents, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 20; Susan P. Koniak, The Law Be-
tween the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1443-44 nn.231-32 (1992). But see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud- Death and Revival of a Professional
Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 303-04 n.50 (1984).
44. KULTGEN, supra note 9, at 226.
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the approach of the ABA Model Rules fascinating for a couple of rea-
sons.
45
First of all, the House of Delegates was persuaded to adopt posi-
tions of Candor to the Tribunal, that is, the requirement that criminal
defense lawyers disclose client perjury to the court, that were hotly
opposed by the criminal defense bar. Then, at the urging of the pri-
vate corporate bar, the House hijacked the concept of zealous advo-
cacy, and incorporated it into the Rules in the form of the zealous cor-
porate lawyer.4" While a criminal defense lawyer must disclose per-
jury, the corporate lawyer cannot make disclosures to correct or pre-
vent corporate fraud or crime. This may or may not be another illus-
tration of professional class struggle, 7 but it is another illustration of
"who makes the rules."
What is even more intriguing is that in rewriting the proposals to
"protect their client," and arguably serve their own interests, the cor-
porate lawyers may have actually accomplished just the opposite.
Rule 1.13, as it was adopted, does a good job of telling us who corpo-
rate counsel does not represent (not the CEO or other officer or con-
stituent), but it does not do a very good job of telling us what interests
corporate counsel really is supposed to serve. Certainly, the public in-
terest is not to be served in any immediate sense-whistle blowing is
verboten. Counsel may shout fire in a crowded board room, but other-
wise mum's the word. Professor Gillers points out that by requiring
the lawyer to go no further than the Board, the Rule will, in some
45. I admit that as a state Model Rules Chairman, I made no proposals for modi-
fying Rule 1.13. I am not a corporate lawyer, and I did not really have a handle on the
implications of the Rule. The corporate counsel I appointed to my committee apparently
felt that the Rule provided the right answers. Indeed, there was very little discussion of
Rule 1.13 in the committee, and no comment on it at the public hearing on the Rules.
46. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 589,606 (1985).
[Tihe critical question is whether professional norms appropriate in [the con-
text of the criminal defense paradigm] should serve as the paradigm for all
legal practice. Yet the bar's exaltation of individualism remains heavily para-
sitic on the criminal defense role. In commenting on the Model Rules, the
ABA General Practice and Corporate Law Sections cast the lawyer as a
'champion against a hostile world' and a Tearless advocate' protecting indi-
viduals in their struggles with the state.
Id. The "highly abstracted encomiums to individualism fail to explain the wholesale ap-
propriation of adversarial norms in the defense of organizational interests." Id. at 608.
47. Prior to a recent reworking of Rule 1.5 by the Ethics 2000 Commission,
plaintiffs' lawyers could be disciplined if their contingent fee contracts were not in writ-
ing, but corporate lawyers did not have to have written fee agreements. Remember adver-
tising and trial publicity. Historically, advertising has been the life blood of the plaintiffs'
personal injury bar, trial publicity has been the lifeblood of the criminal defense bar. The
corporate bar has had the country clubs.
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cases at least, tell the lawyer that he or she is "not authorize[d] [to
make a] disclosure of confidential information where the client [the
entity? the shareholders?] is the victim of [a constituent's--the CEO's
or the CFO's 8] wrongdoing, even where the [constituent] is the cli-
ent's fiduciary." 9 "In terms of the triangular relationship among coun-
sel, the client, and the client's agents [the Board], the first must al-
ways accept the decision of the third." In other words, if the interests
of the shareholders are paramount, and are to be served by their fidu-
ciary constituent-this is what corporation law says, or at least what
corporate lawyers say it says--then there is something wrong with
Rule 1.13. As Professor Gillers says:
The client's interests are what we sacrifice. Instead we honor
the interests of a presumptively corrupt highest authority to
whom the lawyer owes no duty. And, transparently, we honor
the interests of lawyers themselves. One need not be a profes-
sional cynic to discover in Rule 1.13 a resolution that will in-
gratiate lawyers to the very corporate officers who decide the
terms and conditions of their employment or retainers, pre-
dictable costs to the client notwithstanding.1
After Enron everyone asked, "Where were the lawyers?" Recently
two of my colleagues answered, "[right where the Model Rules said
they should be."" Arguably, the Rule strips the corporate lawyer of
power. On the other hand, that may be what corporate counsel want.
Proposals for amendment of Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 were re-
cently offered to the House of Delegates by the Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion. The proposals were, by and large, rejected. But in the meantime
something is happening that should be a cause for alarm. Federal
regulators, and Congress, 53 are stepping in to do what the ABA re-
fuses to do. If the bar loses its privilege of self-regulation, will it still
48. One suspects from Enron and WorldCom that Directors are often dominated
by CEOs, who, because of the importance of share prices, are often dominated by CFOs.
49. Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question
of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 302-03 (1987).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 304.
52. Rutheford Campbell, Jr. & Eugene Gaetke, Abstract: The Ethical Obligation
of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers (a paper delivered at a law school) (on file
with author).
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. See Enact-
ment of Broad Accounting, Corporate Governance Reform Act Brings New Prohibitions,
Requirements for Executives and Auditors, 71 U.S.L.W. 2114 (2002); SEC Must Issue At.
torney Conduct Rules Under New Federal Accounting Reform Law: Law Requires New
Lawyer Rules, 71 U.S.L.W. 2079 (2002).
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be worthy of calling itself a profession? Must we chase down this blind
alley in pursuit of the accountants?
VI. A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE
KENTUCKY RULES
Codes and Rules are, in fact, helpful. But the way they are made
can be distressing and amusing. How were the Rules "made," or
rather modified and adopted at the state level? Making Rules is like
making sausage: it's not pretty.
A. The Camera Eye (9)
I am participating in Continuing Legal Education events across
the state. My role is to familiarize local lawyers with the proposed
ABA Model Rules. There is some hostility to the Rules, and there is
something of a grass roots movement against their adoption." Cer-
tainly, the ATLA and its state affiliates have led a campaign against
them. The complaint I get the most is that Rule 3.3(a)(2), which re-
quires a lawyer to "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the con-
trolling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, ' 6 is new
and alien, and inconsistent with an adversary system of law. A num-
ber of lawyers also become indignant when they see Rule 3.4(e) pro-
hibiting assertions of personal opinion or belief. They actually think
that I made this up. When I point out the fact that the "new" rules are
identical to DR 7-106(3)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(4) of the Model Code,
which have been the prevailing disciplinary standards in the state for
many years, my audiences are incredulous. 5
Remember lawyer Tom Hagen in the movie The Godfather? He
had only one client-a "special client." There are lawyers like that to-
day. They work exclusively for the Titanic Insurance Company.57 Ok,
I'm kidding around a little, but my point is that professional inde-
pendence, a "core value" of the legal profession, seems to be the last
thing on lawyer's minds these days. From "managed law" 8 to busi-
54. The ethics chairman that I replaced had already completed a draft set of new
DRs (that is, a new version of the Code), hoping that it could be presented to head off con-
sideration of the Model Rules. As far as I know he was doing this on his own authority,
since the bar president who appointed me specifically instructed me to form a review
committee to look at the rules.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (1983).
56. See Richard H. Underwood, The Professiona and the Liar, 87 KY. L.J. 919,
937 (1999).
57. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).
58. "Managed law" is what I use to describe the relationship between some in-
surance companies and their "captive" lawyers.
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ness-getting59 kickback schemes (with stockbrokers and financial ana-
lysts," referral services, fee splitting with paralegals6 ), to partner-
ships with non-lawyers (including joint ventures with expert wit-
nesses),5 2 this core value, and Rule 5.4, are under attack.
B. The Camera Eye (10)
I am appointed the Chairman of our state's Model Rules Study
Committee.63 The Committee is made up of well known and active
practitioners, two law professors, and even a federal judge. The areas
of specialization represented include family law, personal injury, es-
tate planning, corporate, insurance defense, and criminal defense.
None of these lawyers are particularly hostile to the Model Rules, al-
though one corporate counsel opines that he likes the ATLA American
Lawyers' Code the best. Things proceed pretty smoothly during our
meetings. Occasionally there are some odd proposals, and on several
occasions I am in the minority. One big surprise comes as we are re-
viewing Model Rule 5.4. One of the more sophisticated of the members
gets pretty excited about Rule 5.4(d)(2), which provides that "[a] law-
yer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:... (2) a
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof. ... "" He wants
this deleted, because "[wie ought to be able to do what everyone else
can do." The others agree, and as I recall the vote was overwhelming.
We ended up with a very eccentric Rule if you ask me. Why would
59. Collection lawyers have proposed taking all of a creditor's collection work for
a flat fee, even agreeing to pay all of the expenses of litigation without reimbursement.
Along the same lines, plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers have argued that the rules
should be changed to permit them to purchase work by agreeing to pay litigation ex-
penses without reimbursement, and even lending clients money for living expenses.
60. See KBA Comm. on Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. E-390
(1996).
61. One of my favorite news stories was based on an interview with the wife of a
popular politician. She worked as a paralegal for a law firm. She went on and on about
how she enjoyed working with lawyer Smith (we will call him), and she particularly ap-
preciated his generous fee-splitting arrangement for cases that she brought into the firm.
62. KBA Comm. on Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. E-394 (1996).
63. After doing the leg work to get the ABA Rules adopted in Kentucky, I as-
sumed that it would be easy to get permission from the ABA to reprint the Rules at the
end of my book TRIAL EMICS, which was about to be published. After requesting permis-
sion, I received a letter from the ABA President, who was from my own state, who pointed
out that the Rules are copyrighted, and that I would have to pay royalties. He suggested
that I did not appreciate all of the expense and hard work that went into the making and
adoption of the Rules--something had to be recouped. I guess I should have known that
the ABA needed money.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d)(2) (1985).
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anyone want a non-lawyer director or officer? What about professional
independence? I am still puzzled."
C. The Camera Eye (11)
I am at the public hearing that has been scheduled so that mem-
bers of the bar and the public can comment on the Proposed Kentucky
Model Rules. I am nervous, because a year earlier, at an annual meet-
ing of the bar, I had reported on the Committee's plan to consider the
Model Rules, and I had provided a brief overview of the Rules. During
a break, a member of the supreme court confronted me and accused
me of committing fraud by recommending the Rules. He was espe-
cially hot over Rules 3.1 and 4.2.1 I barked right back at him. He is
used to dishing it out, and not to taking it. The President (or was he
President-elect, who can keep track?) of the Bar Association was
standing there taking it in. He was amused, but he said nothing. He
represents clients before the court.
I hope that things will go smoother this time. I sit at a long,
raised table peopled with selected supreme justices, Bar leaders and
members of the Committee. At the other end of the cavernous room is
an equally long table sparsely populated by members of the press,
most of whom are dozing. There is a pretty good crowd, but they are
not particularly engaged. I recall that when the ABA Rules were be-
ing considered in San Francisco, the proceedings were reportedly bois-
terous, and the press had a field day exploiting the fact that most of
the debate, and the rancor, was about Rule 1.5 and lawyers' fees.6 7 In
contrast, this seems a rather staid affair.
Things go well until we come to Rule 3.3. One of the members of
my committee, who voiced no opposition to the rule in committee,
rises to condemn Rule 3.3(3) as a new and alien rule that runs con-
65. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonawuyer Partner: Moderate Pro-
posals Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383 (1988) for a discussion of the prob-
lem.
66. The original draft of Rule 3.1 would have required a lawyer to have a "rea-
sonable basis" for filing a lawsuit. By this time, the Rule had been watered down to re.
quire only a non-frivolous basis. So what was his beef? Rule 4.2 was another matter. He
wanted to maintain the earlier Kentucky view, that only speaking or managing agents
are off limits. (He still hadn't gotten used to the new Kentucky Rules of Evidence, which
adopted a broad defimition of vicarious admissions.) His position on Rule 4.2 was, of
course, perfectly defensible. In any event, I suspect that he had been influenced by the
ATLA position. Every year he accepted the "Outstanding Judge" award from the state
branch of the ATLA. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-
1516 (1986) (stating that such associations, which are associated with a particular "side of
the v," should not offer such awards, and judges should not accept them).
67. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud- Death and Revival
of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 302-03 (1984).
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trary to his assumptions about an adversary system of justice. Heads
nod in agreement, including the head of at least one supreme court
justice. I had expected a challenge to Rule 3.3(4), having to do with a
duty to take reasonable remedial measures when the client commits
perjury. But nothing was said about that. Are we going to rewrite the
Rules in a public hearing? By the time we get to Rule 8.3, things are
getting a bit worrying. A number of folks are really troubled by what
they call this "snitch rule," which requires the reporting of miscon-
duct. I point out that the proposed rule would actually require less re-
porting than the current rule. This doesn't seem to register with the
audience."
The recommendations of the Model Rules Study Committee are
submitted to the court. The Committee members are not invited to
meet with the court. The court has no questions for the Committee.
Time passes. More time passes. Finally the new Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct are adopted by the court, and emerge as Su-
preme Court Rule 3.130 (1990). But some very strange things have
taken place behind closed doors. Rule 3.3(a)(3) has been deleted! It
strikes me as particularly odd that the judges of the highest appellate
court of the state would decide that a lawyer should have no obliga-
tion to disclose to them legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the law-
yer's client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. Has any other state
made such a modification? But wait, there's more. The duty to report
68. See Rotunda, supra note 6, at 663-65, for one author's anecdotal evidence of
lawyer ignorance of existing minimum standards set by their ethics codes. "[A] lawyer
was asked, during her deposition, as to whether she had secured her client's waiver of a
conflict. Her response: 'I don't even know what a conflict waiver is, if you want to know
the truth."' Id. at 663-64. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105; MODEL
RULE OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7. "[One of my former academic colleagues... was asked
whether she bought malpractice insurance.... She responded that she did not have to
buy insurance because her contract with her clients required them to waive any malprac-
tice claims against her." Rotunda, supra note 6, at 664. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102; MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.8(h). For a couple of
more examples from my neck of the woods, I offer the following. Every year I am told by
one of my job hunting students that potential employers tell them that they will have to
sign noncompete covenants when they join the firm. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108; MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 5.6(a). One of my pet
peeves is the way that local lawyers continue to use partnership names like "Jones &
Smith," while at the same time maintaining that they are only sharing office space. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFIL RESPONSIBIlrrY DR 2-102(C); MODEL RULE OF PROFL CONDUCT
K 7.5(d). Another partnership name issue comes up when a lawyer wants to add to his
firm name the name of a lawyer with whom he has never practiced law-usually a "dead
guy." I have had several requests for advice about adding a famous "dead guy" to the let-
terhead, out of a desire to "honor him." Sure-like Adams, Lincoln, Jefferson, Pound,
Hand, Cardozo, and Underwood. The list goes on.
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lawyer misconduct has been deleted! So much for the responsibility of
the members of a self-regulating profession. Has any other state made
such a modification? There are other peculiar changes. Rule 3.8 (Spe-
cial Responsibilities of a Prosecutor) has been changed to delete Rule
3.8(c)! That was never even mentioned at the public hearing. Are
there some former prosecutors on the court?
I am discouraged. I am even more discouraged when, later, I
hear the argument advanced at a Board of Governors meeting that
lawyer's can (and should) still be disciplined for nondisclosure of con-
trolling authority under Rules 3.3(a)(1) ("a lawyer shall not make a
false statement of material... law to a tribunal') and 4.1(a) ("a law-
yer shall not knowingly make a false statement of... law to a third
person."). If we are going to demand disclosure, why don't we do it
straight up? Aren't we setting traps for lawyers? Is this a game? What
about the lawyer's right to notice of what the rules of the game are?"
VII. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING?
I have noted throughout this short piece that practicing lawyers
may not be all that familiar with the contents of the Model Code and
Model Rules, that Code provisions and Rules can be narrowly inter-
preted to serve lawyer self-interest, and that there may be no real
consensus as to the "core values" of the profession. The drift toward
practice in limited liability companies, and the drift toward multi-
disciplinary practice, illustrate this.
A. The Camera Eye (12)
I am at a meeting of the Board of Governors. A former member of
the Board, representing the proponents of a new Supreme Court Rule
permitting lawyers to practice in the form of a limited liability com-
pany, is making his case. I have no personal, financial interest in the
outcome of the decision of the Board, but I am skeptical. He asserts,
among other things, that the ethical rules and ethical considerations
never required a lawyer to be responsible for the acts of the lawyer's
partner. That's just "tort law." The literal language of Rule 1.8(h) and
DR 6-102 only prohibit limiting the liability of "the lawyer." I cannot
resist pointing out the traditional justification for the rules permitting
lawyers in a firm to split fees, while prohibiting lawyers who are not
in the same firm from splitting fees except in proportion to the ser-
vices they actually perform, was that the partners of a firm are vicari-
ously liable for each other's malpractice. He does not seem to appreci-
ate the point, and announces, in effect, "Itihat has nothing to do with
69. See In re A, 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).
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this." That's all it takes. So much for the Professor. A new Rule
passes. Under the new Supreme Court Rule, lawyers are no longer re-
sponsible for their partner's malpractice. A law firm need no longer
stand behind its work. It only need put up a certain amount of insur-
ance. I am bemused. Partners in a firm may split fees while avoiding
liability.1° Lawyers who are not in a firm presumably may not. An-
other example of different rules for different folks-a class system? It
all depends on who makes the Rules.
Did the proponents of the new rule accurately state the history of
the professional rules? I don't think so. The tradition in England had
long been that "[i]n professional practice, as in law, the responsibility
of the consultant covers not merely his own acts and omissions but
also those of his partners and the staff of the firm.'"' Lawyers in
America either practiced solo or in traditional partnerships. Under
partnership law the rule was vicarious liability, and it probably never
occurred to lawyers that they could limit their liability, because they
were not permitted to practice in a corporate form. Indeed, when the
states began to allow lawyers to practice in professional service corpo-
rations (PSCs) for tax purposes, state courts refused to permit limited
liability.72 Perhaps the realities of modern transactions, the complex-
ity of the law, and the magnitude of potential liability call for a policy
change. But policy was not discussed. But let's turn for a moment to
the local history. How did we get the new rule?
We got the new rule because the big accounting firms rammed
through limited liability in the state legislature. The law firms-dare
I say it, the big firms--saw the financial advantages that the account-
ants had, and wanted the same break. They hit the legislature and got
the statutes amended to allow law firms to practice as limited liability
companies. Then they simply changed their paperwork, and an-
nounced that they were LLPs and LLCs. Other firms quickly followed
70. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'i Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1514
(1985).
71. F.AR. BENNION, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: THE CONSULTANT PROFESSIONS
AND THEIR CODES 100-01 (London 1969). See also Walter W. Steele, Jr., How Lawyers
Protect the Family Jewels... The Invention Of Limited Liability Partnership, 39 S. TEX.
L. REV. 621, 623-24 (1998) (suggesting that the traditional reason lawyers practiced in
general partnerships was to signal to their clients that the lawyers in the fi-m were fidu-
ciaries who were offering up their fortunes and liability insurance policies to back up the
quality of the firm's work, and that the development of the PC or professional corporation
was motivated by tax considerations rather than liability considerations).
72. See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 237 (West Publishing, Co.
1986). See also KBA Comm. on Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. E-25 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 47 (1998).
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suit.73 Later, a handful of fastidious lawyers began to ask the question
of whether they could do that. The firms apparently got a little nerv-
ous, and asked the Ethics Committee for a favorable opinion. My
Committee balked. This seemed to be not so much a question calling
for interpretation, but rather a question of policy, calling for legisla-
tion. We recommended that the proponents of limited liability seek a
Rule change. They tried and failed, and then pressed us again. We
still refused, because the court had specifically rejected their proposal
in an order that said that the court did not think that firms could "so
limit their liability." We could not overrule the supreme court. This
did not add to my popularity. But to make a long story short, the pro-
ponents finally got what they wanted (which they almost always do).
Their efforts may have been boosted by an opinion of the ABA Ethics
Committee.74 Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.024 now allows law
firm partners to limit their liability for the malpractice of other law-
yers in the firm. As part of the deal the firms must carry certain
amounts of insurance. Perhaps the insurance limits are adequate. The
final sentence of the statute also says that each co-owner of a limited
liability law firm cannot relieve himself or herself of liability for per-
sonal acts of malpractice or for the malpractice of any person under
his or her direct supervision and control.
The most interesting question of late is whether lawyers are go-
ing to be able to engage in multidisciplinary practice. 75 Having seen
what happened to Arthur Anderson and Arthur Anderson's clients, it
is hard to see how the proponents of multidisciplinary practice can be
so enthusiastic about it. Won't lawyers lose any semblance of profes-
sional independence? What about the conflicts? If a law firm is mak-
ing big bucks from the sale of related services, how can they deliver
independent and responsible legal advice? What about the potential
liabilities? While interest in multidisciplinary practice is not confined
to the big firms, they do seem to be the most visible advocates of MDP,
at least in my jurisdiction. The usual arguments are "Why can't we do
what other businesses and professions are doing?"; "Other states are
allowing this and we won't be able to compete with out of state firms";
and 'If we don't accept MDP we will end up working for accounting
firms." Is this the wave of the future for the legal profession or is it in-
73. Professor Kultgen observes that '[tihe professions are staffed by persons of
ordinary conscientiousness and limited good will; that is, people who do what they think
is right if the cost is not great and they are convinced that others will do likewise."
KULm'rEN, supru note 9, at 217. My favorite version of this theme is that "nothing fosters
belief [in a proposition] like self-interest." Richard H. Underwood, Evaluating Scientific
and Forensic Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149 n.32 (2000).
74. ABA Comm. on Ethics and ProMl Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996).
75. "A cottage industry of commentary [has] emerged." See DEBORAH RHODE &
GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY AND REGULATION 187 (2002).
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stead a big step on down the road to "deprofessionalization?" It is wor-
rying.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. The Camera Eye (13)
It is 1984, or so. I am participating as an instructor/team leader
in a summer session, NITA style, trial advocacy course for practicing
lawyers. We are lucky to have, as volunteer critiquers, a number of
excellent, seasoned trial lawyers. One of the problems that the stu-
dents are presented with is a malpractice case, which has been
brought against a young general practitioner who agreed to look at a
worker's compensation case. It does not occur to him that the client
also has a product liability claim. The statute of limitations runs on
that claim. The lawyer is sued for neglect.6 During the exercises
which follow, possible theories of liability are presented through an
expert witness. The possibility of introducing the disciplinary rules as
evidence of a standard of care is explored.77 The older law-
yers/instructors are incredulous. 'The Code is not law... there was
no contract.., he did not agree to do the product liability claim." I
have to show them the case of Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller and
Keefe. 8 They seem genuinely shocked that a lawyer would face liabil-
ity in such a situation. I am fairly confident that they would not be
shocked if a similar negligence claim were brought against a physi-
cian, or even a railroad. 'What comes around goes around."
While I am dealing out clich6s, I might as well end with the sug-
gestion that if lawyers keep on trying to be like accountants, they may
end up, sadly, "getting exactly what they are asking for."
76. Cf Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that a
lawyer who took a wrongful death accident case for an estate, but overlooked potential
medical malpractice claim, could not use the defense that he did not contract to pursue a
malpractice claim).
77. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. f
(1998).
78. 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980). See also Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The Code was incorporated into the law through a Kentucky Su.
preme Court Rule.
